Examining
Rowe’s Evidential Argument and the Problem of Evil
by
Leonard Lee Brunk
Introduction
The problem of evil has been examined by many
philosophers and theologians over the years, and in recent years the evidential
argument from William Rowe has inspired intellectuals to more critically
reexamine the problem. In this paper Rowe’s evidential argument will be
examined premise by premise to determine if this argument is sound, and to do
this some arguments against his position will be observed as well. Rowe’s main
objection towards belief in God is founded primarily on the idea being if God
is truly good and just, He would not tolerate gratuitous evils. Now, Rowe is
very confident all people must ultimately confess there are evils which have
occurred, and will occur again, serving no greater purpose, completely
unbeneficial for humanity. The notion of unnecessary evils must be examined,
and one must consider to what degree the evils tolerated by God help serve a
greater purpose. If Rowe is correct about unnecessary evils being evidence against
a good and just God, this will be revealed upon investigating the counterarguments
to his claim.
Considering the First Premise from a Biblical
Perspective
In this world where unnecessary suffering seems
to occur quite often there are those who have concluded because of purposeless
suffering God must not exist. Here is where Rowe begins the argument, in
stating the first premise being;
1.
There
exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being
could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some
evil equally bad or worse.[1]
The theist should first consider what
knowledge the scriptures provide with regards to these unnecessary instances of
suffering. Unsurprisingly, there is an entire book found in the scriptures, Ecclesiastes,
dedicated to addressing what appears to be meaningless in this world. In this
book Solomon wisely expresses how sorrow can be good for the heart, better than
laughter, because when one is lost in pleasure they fail to recognize and care
for those who are in mourning (Ecce. 7:2-4 NIV).[2] The writer later speaks on the need for one
to be balanced. Readers are told to not be too righteous, which could lead to
self-righteousness, but neither should one be overwicked, for there are
instances where the wicked live long lives while the righteous die prematurely
(v. 15-18). He goes onto state, “The man who fears God will avoid all extremes”
(v.18). In the conclusion readers are reminded on how apart from God everything
is meaningless, so people are to revere God and trust in His commands, for He
will rightly judge all the good and the evil (v. 12:13-14). So, the Christian
theist recognizes because there are instances where people suffer horribly, as
a result there comes those who are sympathetic with the sufferer. For the one
who has only ever focused on the pleasures of life there is a lack of empathy
and therefore a lack of wisdom. The theist recognizes all people are capable of
being balanced, but the reason one can be balanced is because the amount of
evil in this world does not outweigh the greater good. In the end, God will
righteously judge all such matters and the good will triumph over all evil. From
a Christian theist perspective, one recognizes God took direct responsibility
for what had come of His creation, and in Christ one has hope in a redeemed
world to come.[3] So with regards to the first premise
presented by Rowe, the theist can argue even if there appears to be unnecessary
suffering, in Christ one sees God has paid a price offering hope of escape from
this fallen world. Therefore, when the faithful witnesses what appears to be
unnecessary suffering, one is more inclined to long for Heaven, and the day God
will bring an end to all suffering and injustice. Even the worst of evils
cannot cause the Christian to forget the great hope found in Christ, thus from
the suffering the Christian matures spiritually, and the greater good prevails.
The Soul-Building Argument
One argument presented to counter Rowes’ first
premise is inspired by John Hicks’ soul-building theodicy. Hick believes the
evils known in this world help humans grow morally and thus the soul-making
process is enthused as a result of evil and suffering.[4] Hick argues if in another world God made
humans aware suffering was for the sake of soul-building, such people would
have no compulsion to overcome evil, for they would recognize there was no
greater evils to overcome.[5] In other words what motivates humans to seek
out ways of overcoming certain evils in life would not be possible if people
could perceive of there being meaning behind every form of evil tolerated by
God.[6] What is interesting here is the point being
the potential soul-building resulting from certain evils is only possible
because there is seemingly excessive evil which seems to serve no purpose. So,
the paradox is soul-building happens because of the seemingly unnecessary evil.[7] Though respecting the counterargument from
Hick, Rowe still seems to believe a person can determine how much evil is
necessary for soul-building.[8] Rowe explains how the number of those killed
in the Holocaust could have been less and the building of souls would have
still come as a result, so therefore there is excessive evil which serves no purpose.[9] This reasoning should bring to mind for the
Christian the unjust suffering Christ endured and His unwarranted death on the
cross. The one who recognizes Jesus in history but denies His resurrection may
at first see the suffering endured by Christ as unnecessary. Yet even in
rejecting Christ deity the scholar cannot deny the greater good which can come
about as a result of one placing their faith in Christ. Rowe brings up the
hypothetical fawn who dies a horrible death for no reason.[10] One can just as easily imagine a scenario
where an innocent lamb is tortured by young boys for sport, and no one is there
to prevent the poor lamb from being tortured to death. If God desired to prove
the greater good is somehow exemplified by the seemingly unnecessary evils He
would have to directly connect with the fruitless death of the innocent.
Rowe argues for their being an excessive
amount of certain evils incapable of serving a greater good and feels this is difficult
to deny.[11] Therefore, the second premise to the argument,
which will be analyzed more closely later, argues if God is real, He would
prevent certain horrific evils without preventing a greater good or bringing about
greater evil.[12] If God is the Christian concept of God, then
noticeably the human mind would be limited at understanding the mind of God. A
person should humbly recognize their thoughts and ways are incomparable to
Gods’, just as His realm is higher than the human realm so must Gods’ ways and
thoughts be higher than a finite being (Isa. 55:8-9).
Stephen Wykstra offers a relevant counterargument
to the evidential and deductive stages of the argument sanctioned by Rowe. Wykstra
argues from the perspective being humans cannot rightly judge the mind of God,
for what appears to be an evil God is unjust in tolerating may indeed serve a
justifiable purpose.[13] Where Bruce Reichenbach argued for Rowe being
guilty of appealing to ignorance, Wykstra recognizes this may not be the case
because in the example given of the fawn dying a slow death Rowe comments on
there not ‘appearing’ to be a greater good attributed to the suffering the fawn
endured.[14] So, one must wonder if the appearance of unnecessary
evil is enough of an argument to outweigh any evidence pointing towards the
possibility of a greater good resulting from the evil. What is worth noting is
on how what appears to be the case for Rowe may not appear as such for the
faithful Christian. Wykstra refers to the Condition of Reasonable Epistemic
access, or CORNEA, which challenges what Rowe believes to be strong evidence
against God.[15] The wisdom of God would obviously be much
greater than the wisdom of man. So, when the finite human judges for what God
should do, or what He should not allow, this is like a toddler judging their
parents’ actions.[16] Therefore what appears to be true for Rowe
would not appear as such from Gods perspective. Rowe has accepted the
evidential point to Wykstra’s CORNEA, but still feels the apparent excess of
meaningless evils in this world is enough for one to rationally conclude God
does not exist.[17] Rowe does not feel God has any justifiable reason for tolerating
certain evils’, and perhaps this is because Rowe is not truly considering the
kind of God Christians’ believe in. One must remember when arguing against the
Christian God and using the problem of evil as a starting point, one is
attempting to argue against the morality of a God who created human life at the
cost of personal suffering. One is attempting to argue against a God who
personally endured suffering out of love for those undeserving. In this case,
considering how God does offer a promise of eternal joy in a realm without
suffering, when one argues against God because of the suffering in this world
one is rejecting His offer. All the answers will not be discovered in this
temporary realm of existence. However, there is enough good reason to believe
God is love, as found in Christ. One can never fully trust in someone until taking
the initiative to enter a relationship with the person. In this world there is
not too much evil to prevent one from recognizing the greater good and having rational
reasons for trusting in the love of God.
When analyzing the first premise Rowe presents
one is intended to recognize based on the rationality behind what can be
observed about potentially unnecessary evils, one should conclude God does not
exist. Rowe asks readers to consider the suffering of the fawn in the distant
forest, a suffering which serves no purpose.[18] Because one could rationally assume suffering
which serves no purpose does occur Rowe presents his second premise, where the
first part states, “(2) An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the
occurrence of any intense suffering it could…”[19] To this first part Alvin Plantinga has
already agreed, but in his Freewill Defense he has successfully argued logic
permits one to believe God could not have created a world containing only moral
good without there also being moral evil.[20] Which, the second premise to Rowes’ argument
concurs the only reason God would not prevent certain sufferings is if in doing
so the cost would be losing a greater good or letting an equal evil or worse
evil occur.[21] Rowe agrees Plantinga may have solved the
logical problem of evil but when considering the epistemological form of the
problem the atheist has a rational reason for not believing in God.[22] Rowe believes the freewill argument fails
because any person can imagine a better world than the present one, where the
lack of certain evils would not take from the greater good. The argument is if
the world contained less immoral fiends like Hitler this would not take away
from peoples’ freewill to choose between right and wrong, and since God does
not prevent the extreme evils, atheism is justified.[23] What Rowe is actually saying is from a
personal perspective certain evils seem unjustified therefore one has a right
to judge God and reject Him.
When considering the second premise from a
biblical perspective one must remember God is a righteous judge. The evil
allowed is building up to a point where when God does bring judgement down all
will recognize He is a righteous and just God (Gen. 15:16; Dan. 8:23).[24] People may wonder why Christ did not return
sooner, as the early Christians’ believed He would, but God is patient and He
desires for many more people to become His children (2 Pet. 3:8). If Jesus returned
too soon so many in the world who never heard of His teachings, His sacrifice,
the resurrection, they would simply be confused knowing nothing about this God.
Others would see the early return of Jesus as a sign of Him seeking after
revenge and wanting to punish those who wronged Him. In other words, if Christ
returned too soon the entire gospel message would be misunderstood by most of
the world, and His justice balanced with His great love would not be freely
recognized. In the present day most of the world has heard about who Jesus
Christ is and what He has to offer those who will accept Him. Jesus made clear
He would not return until the whole world has heard the gospel, until all
nations have knowledge of who He is and what He has done (Matt. 24:14). Even
today if Christ returned for all to see no person who has heard about His
sacrifice and resurrection could rationally argue He is wrong to bring down
judgment against all evil and those who chose to reject Him. Even considering
the profuse amount of seemingly unnecessary evils, if the whole world knew of
what Christ has done, upon His return and impending judgment, no person could
rightly judge Him as being unjust. Rowe is simply trying to argue one is
rational to believe God does not exist because of gratuitous evil, yet in the
same paper admits the theist has rational reasons to believe in God.[25] This just serves to prove God has created a
world balanced enough where a person can freely believe in God, for rational
reasons, or choose to argue there appears to be good enough reason to reject
God. Therefore, Rowe is admitting his entire argument is not direct evidence
against God, but simply meant to show an atheist can rationally justify their
lack of belief, just as well as the theist can justify their belief.[26] This is equivalent to someone choosing to not
believe in God simply because one cannot see God, yet also agreeing an unseen
God may likely exist as well.
The theist should sympathize with the point
Rowe is trying to emphasize in his argument. Wykstra is right to argue the
finite mind cannot understand Gods’ purposes for allowing certain evils, but
this does not mean God has no good reasons.[27] However, Rowe does not simply leave readers
with the hypothetical scenario involving the suffering fawn, but he brings up a
real scenario which forces the theist to respond. The theist is asked if there
is rational reason to believe God is justified in allowing the suffering
endured by a five-year old girl, who was beaten, raped, and strangled to death.[28] Rowe is wanting readers to ponder the
epistemic probabilities, and the critical theist should not overlook what Rowe
is trying to argue.[29] Though no one would argue for the rape and
murder of children being justified to serve a greater good, the Christian is
left remembering why there is a Hell for the unrepentant murderer, and why
there is an eternal Heaven for the child victims. The main point to the
argument Rowe gives is the claim there are certain evils which no greater good
can outweigh, or defeat.[30] Simply stating one cannot be certain this is
true because one cannot understand the mind of God, does not seem to be good
enough for Rowe and others, when considering the rape and murder of a five year
old girl. The theist is being called to recognize every incident of horrific evil,
which cannot be countered with greater redeeming good, lowers the probability
of God existing.[31] The theist needs to determine if this is a
rational and fair proposition. Perhaps the Christian should take a moment and
reflect on a truth which has been determined by statistical probabilities.
Wherever and whenever the church is the most comfortable the church is the
weakest. Where there is the increase of pleasure and comfort the growth of the
church decreases, and there is an increase of those who leave the church.
Wherever and whenever there is an increase of unjustified persecution against
the church, there is the increase of faith and often the church grows. In China
even when those against the church provide the lowest estimates these numbers
prove despite the persecution, or as a result of the persecution, the church in
China is growing rapidly.[32] Even the persecuted faithful Christians in
the Middle East do not take what non-believers would deem the easier route and
renounce their faith.[33]
The argument Rowe presents is the kind meant
to encourage like-minded peers, proving worthwhile to atheists, but not so
impressive to the intellectual theist.[34] The one who supports the freewill defense has
already established the existence of God is not incompatible with the degree of
evil known in this world, nor even the apparently pointless evil.[35] Imagine a righteous judge has promised to
bring justice against all the criminals in the City of Despondency. Furthermore,
this judge promises compensation for the innocent victims, ten times from the
amount they had lost or suffered. If the judge proves able to accomplish what
was promised the judge cannot rightly be labeled as unjust for not arriving to
the city sooner. If the judge can prove righteousness prevails over the lesser
evil, then even the worst of evils cannot be used as an argument against the justice
served by such a judge. Arguing the instances of seemingly meaningless
suffering is evidence against God fails on multiple levels. This argument does
not prove so rational an argument to counter neither the freewill defense, nor
the soul-building argument, neither the Calvinist view of Gods' grace or the
Arminian view.[36] If one can present evidence for the justice
and love of God far surpassing all the evil known in this world, this is enough
to properly defend the Christian God, regardless of some apparently senseless
evils.
Apart from Christ Rowe would be Correct
The
Christian must argue against the proposal given by Rowe while bearing Christ in
mind. Many still proclaim Rowe presented a solid and praiseworthy argument
against theism. Nick Trakakis even stated, ‘the only rational course of action
left for the theist to take is to abandon theism and convert to atheism.’[37] Therefore,
in concluding the argument Rowe asserts;
Rowe
assumes this to be true, because of personal observations of apparent evils
which do not serve a greater good, or hypothetical evils which should not be
tolerated by God. If there was no notion of there being some great evil
necessary to overcome, the entire gospel message would be meaningless. All
stories true and those inspired by the truth involve characters' who often
stand against seemingly impossible odds. When one hears of an innocent child
being brutally tortured and murdered the hearts of most have not grown so cold
to leave one unmoved by such an unnecessary evil act. No, most people who hear
of such a despicable evil feel anger against a cruel world capable of such
unnecessary suffering, and one also feels remorse. In the least all people will
recognize the world needs to change and is very broken. The Christian is at an
advantage, for their very faith is grounded in the suffering of their Lord,
hence the temporary trials and suffering in this world are expected, but the
hope Christ gives proves far superior.[39] Because
of the evil Christ allowed to be done to Him, and because of His sacrificial
suffering and death the Christian is empowered to express humility and share
the love of Christ even when knowing of, or facing the greatest of evils.[40] So,
again the argument Rowe presents may make sense from the perspective of an
atheist, but from the perspective of the Christian theist Rowe presents no valid
evidence against God.
Many
missionaries recognize often those in the most hopeless of situations are more
likely to respond to Christ than those who come from the most prosperous and
pleasure ridden places. For the child dying of Aids in Africa the only hope the
one suffering has is found in Christ. For the widow in a war-torn village after
a genocidal raid resulted in the deaths of her children, if not for knowing her
family loved Jesus, and the belief in eternal life, the widow would be left
hopeless.
(1)
Even the greatest of evils cannot make hope
in Christ obsolete, or break the spirit of the faithful.
(2)
In the face of the most horrible evils, for
the Christian their hope in Christ increases so the greater good proves more
evident.
(3)
The Christian recognizes there are many
gratuitous evils in this world seeming to serve no purpose, but at the same
time this truth affirms the world needs a Savior.
(4)
The greatest of evils do not extinguish hope
in a greater good, hence the greatest of evils compels the faithful to depend
on the love of Christ even more.
(5)
Since there is no evil which proves so
powerful as to extinguish the hope of the Christian, but instead only increases
ones' hope in Christ, then it would appear there are no gratuitous evils which fail
to amplify the greater good.
This
argument only proves illogical if faith in Christ proves to be in vain. Since
history has proven without the use of force or intimidation faith in Christ
grows even more despite suffering, this proves hope cannot be extinguished. God
allowed certain evils so His love would be fully recognized in Christ upon Him
defeating evil and death on the cross.[41]
This also serves to prove apart from Christ not only is all suffering
meaningless, but all is meaningless. Since most people recognize there is hope
despite the excessive evil in this world, hope proves more powerful,
particularly hope in Christ. For the Christian who loses a child, even if by
some horrible circumstance such as the child being murdered, even still their
only hope is found in Christ. When the faithful suffer their longing for Heaven
increases, along with the desire to tell others about the only hope there is.
Rowe attempts to
argue all people recognize there are meaningless evils serving no purpose thus
there must be no God. This argument has been analyzed from multiple
perspectives but ultimately this paper has argued apart from faith in Christ
Rowe would be correct. There are horrible evils in this world, but the amount
of evil does not overpower the greater good. Since seemingly meaningless evil
only serves to test and improve on the faith of the Christian the hope one has
in Christ proves relevant, and thus the evils in this world do help to point
one towards a greater good.
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Philip O. "IRAN'S ETHNIC CHRISTIANS: THE ASSYRIANS AND THE
ARMENIANS." Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 61,
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Nick. The God Beyond Belief: In Defence of William Rowe's Evidential
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N.T. Evil and the Justice of God. Downers
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Philosophers. "Foundations of Skeptical Theism: CORNEA, CORE, and
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Yung, Hwa. "The Church in China Today." Transformation 21,
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[1]
William L. Rowe, Nick Trakakis, William L. Rowe on Philosophy of Religion,
(New
York, NY: Routledge, 2016), 336.
[4] John Hick, Evil and the God
of Love, (New; New; ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 256-257.
[10] Marilyn Adams and Robert Adams, The Problem of Evil, 143.
[17]
Stephen J. Wykstra and
Timothy Perrine, and The Society of Christian Philosophers, “Foundations of
Skeptical Theism: CORNEA, CORE, and Conditional Probabilities," (Faith
and Philosophy 29, no. 4 (2012), 376.
[20]
Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, (Grand Rapids,
MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1974), 44.
[22]
William L. Rowe, "Plantinga on Possible Worlds and Evil," The
Journal of Philosophy 70, no. 17 (1973), 555.
[33]
Philip O. Hopkins,
"IRAN'S ETHNIC CHRISTIANS: THE ASSYRIANS AND THE ARMENIANS," Journal
of the Evangelical Theological Society 61, no. 1 (03, 2018), 152.
[37]
Nick Trakakis, The God
Beyond Belief: In Defence of William Rowe's Evidential Argument from Evil, (Vol.
27;27.;. Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 341.
[41] Norman L. Geisler and Frank Turek, I Don’t Have Enough Faith to be an Atheist, (Wheaton, IL. Crossway
Books, 2004), 400.
